This article examines the process, causes and repercussions of the accession of Taiwan, as a contested state, together with China, to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in 1991, the first inter-governmental organization that Taipei has joined since 1971. Based on an analysis of elite interviews, primary and secondary data, the paper traces the under-explored diplomatic history. It argues that changes in Taiwan's domestic and external environments as well as during the diplomatic process have accounted for Taipei's admission, instead of the China factor alone. The four positive effects of accession on Taiwan's international space are explored, as are the implications of the study for Taiwan's continuous survival as a contested state. By undertaking a nuanced analysis of an important yet under-studied milestone in the contested state's struggle to mitigate international isolation, the article sheds light on the study of Taiwan's external ties amid the sovereignty dispute between Taipei and Beijing.
Introduction
After 1949, both the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) strove to win recognition and legitimacy from the international community. This paper presents the findings of original research on an important yet underexplored case of Taiwan's admission to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1991. 9 It moves beyond a state-centric analytical framework to explore how and why APEC became the first IGO that Taipei joined as a contested state, despite Beijing's initial opposition. The first enlargement of APEC took place in Seoul in November 1991, two years after its formation, with Taiwan, the PRC, and Hong Kong (the so-called Three Chinas) admitted as new members. By including three economies that had strong regional links, APEC strengthened its "stature as the single largest forum speaking on the subject of trade liberalization." 10 Although APEC accession was a milestone in Taipei's struggle as a contested state, it has not been thoroughly examined in the scholarly literature. This paper fills the void by explaining the process, causes and repercussions of the accession through original research.
In terms of methodology, a qualitative single case study approach was adopted for this study because of the paucity of existing knowledge about the chosen area of study. 11 This approach allows the researcher to focus on marshalling facts in order to 1 Geldenhuys 2009. 2 Ibid; Berg and Toomla 2009 . 3 Krasner 1999 , 2001 . 4 Geldenhuys 2009; Ker-Lindsay 2012, 19-20 . 5 Krasner 1999 Krasner , 2001 . 6 Cho 2005; Wang 2006; Chang 2010. 7 For Taiwan's evolving status in the international system, see Yahuda 1996; Hickey 2007; Fell 2012, 151-170. 8 Ker-Lindsay 2012, 19-20; Ignatiev 2012. 9 In June 1989, Australian Prime Minister Robert Hawke called for the establishment of a more formal intergovernmental vehicle of regional co-operation resulting in the birth of APEC. See Hawke 1989 Hawke , 1994 Funabashi 1995, 58-61 . 10 Hoon 1991. 11 Gerring 2004. offer a holistic description of the complex case in question and to retain the meaningful characteristics of real-life events. 12 Research methods included in-depth interviews, and the collection of primary and secondary materials. 13 Major interviewees included American and Taiwanese officials and business leaders involved in the diplomacy leading up to Taiwan's accession. Library research was carried out in the US, Taiwan and Mainland China.
The paper is composed of four sections. After the introduction, the second section uses the method of process tracing 14 to detail the pertinent diplomatic history, highlighting the key events and multiple players of state and non-state capacity. The third section argues that a combination of factors emanating from changes in Taiwan's domestic and external environments as well as from the diplomatic process has accounted for Taipei's diplomatic breakthrough. Taiwan's domestic changes, namely its economic success and the pursuit of pragmatic diplomacy as a new foreign policy initiative, were assets for its APEC admission. Externally, Beijing's post-1978 economic reforms and the Tiananmen Incident were also conducive to Taiwan's accession. Moreover, the bottom-up approach to regionalism prior to APEC allowed Once the negotiations started, thorny questions pertaining to the sovereignty dispute between Beijing and Taipei were brought to the negotiation table. They involved issues ranging from the timing of membership, the name of participants, the level of representation, the ministries of representation, to the future hosting of APEC meetings. Procedural questions were also negotiated, such as who would enter the door first, and whether there would be the use of national flags.
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As Lee recalled, the two sides were initially "far apart and compromise seemed elusive," 57 with both merely agreeing not to use flags in the meetings, a consensus already reached when APEC was established.
Besides, the contrasting focus of the two sides loomed large, with Taiwan concerned about substance while Beijing concentrated on process. "Taiwan was interested in the substance of APEC first and the process second. My foreign ministry friends in Taiwan understood the longer-term interest was more on the substantive benefits of APEC than on the diplomatic benefits… Conversely, for Beijing, the focus was on process first, process second and process third, with a focus on substance coming in last," observed an involved American official. 58 On the issue of timing, for example, Beijing initially suggested that the PRC should be the first to be admitted, with the right to veto new applicants. 59 Others, however, insisted on the simultaneous admission of all three in accordance with a prior principle established by APEC.
Taipei's designation was a sticking point in negotiations. Both sides were initially far apart on this topic. Taiwan first put its official name "ROC" on the 
Factor Analysis
Arguably, Taipei successfully joined APEC because of a combination of factors emanating from Taiwan's external and domestic environments as well as from the diplomatic process. The external environment focuses on the trend of regionalism and the China factor, whereas the domestic environment refers to political and economic changes at home.
External and Domestic Changes
The first external factor refers to the shift in regionalism in the Asia-Pacific region. For nearly three decades prior to APEC's inception, regionalism was 60 Chang 1991, 332; Funabashi 1995, 74 This demonstrates that the well-documented economic statecraft was functioning.
Taiwan's economic clout further facilitated the active engagement in regional NGOs by its business leaders, which, in turn, contributed to Taiwan's bid. 
Effects of the Decisions by APEC

Concessions by Beijing and Taipei amid APEC Incentives
Another enabling factor from the diplomatic process resulted from concessions made by Taipei Second, China aspired to engage in this rule-making regional mechanism in order to create a predictable environment for its economic development. 78 Finally, Beijing regarded its accession to APEC useful for its GATT membership.
Politically, APEC's attraction to Beijing was two-fold. First, the regime created a regional setting in which Beijing could pursue its bilateral diplomacy outside formal discussions. 79 After its admission to APEC in Seoul, for instance, the Chinese delegation met the Korean president Roh Tae Woo to discuss bilateral issues, paving the way for the Beijing-Seoul normalization in 1992. Second, accession served as a political asset to Beijing because it marked China's return to the international community after Tiananmen.
Taipei yielded mainly in the name and level of representation for its delegation to APEC. As illustrated above, even before the negotiations Taipei had recognized the external constraints imposed upon its pursuit of membership, thereby indicating its willingness to concede regarding its designation in APEC. Although Taipei put its official designation on the negotiation table, it was highly likely that Taipei knew that it would attend APEC using a different name.
Taipei's priority of joining APEC was clear from the outset. According to Chien, "There is a total consensus in the government that we should participate. The only concern is how we can minimize damage to our country. If we do not participate, it will violate our logic of pragmatic diplomacy."
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To achieve its objective of admission, Taipei was ready to make concessions considering the strong economic and political incentives offered by APEC. In 76 Klintworth 1995, 505. 77 Zhongguo shibao, 12 November 1991. 78 Klintworth 1995 , 497. 79 Deng 1997 Interview, Frederick Chien. In sum, both political rivals, partly driven by perceived gains from their membership of APEC, put accession as the first priority, thereby making concessions over negotiations in order to achieve their top objective.
Convergence of Interests among Actors Other Than Beijing and Taipei
During the diplomatic process leading up to the first enlargement of APEC, the impact of what Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye describe as "the multiple channels of 81 Interview with Chiang Pin-k'un, the then Vice Minister of Economic Affairs, Taipei, 10 November 1997. 82 Hu, Yu-li. 1991. "Duozuoshaoshui jiaru yataijinghehui Nanhan youzou liangan he Xianggang sanfang tongshi ruhui queshi youkeneng" (Doing more and talking less: South Korea's shuttle diplomacy involved both sides of the Strait and Hong Kong and may lead to simultaneous participation by three parities), Lianhe Bao, 21 July. 83 However, these official channels were supplemented by the unofficial ones, especially when the Taiwanese diplomat was excluded from the inaugural meeting. It was Koo that attended the opening banquet, whereas his official partner stayed outside the official gathering. By utilizing his "unofficial" status as the PBEC representative at the banquet, Koo pursued the official interest of Taiwan -to be admitted to the IGO.
84 Keohane and Nye 1977, 24-25 . 85 Nevertheless, these unilateral pronouncements helped make Taiwan's accession possible.
Conclusion
To conclude, Taiwan's APEC accession was an important yet under-studied breakthrough in the contested state's struggle to break its international isolation which The accession has four positive effects on Taipei's position as a contested state. First, Taiwan's de facto recognition as a state has become consolidated since 1991 because of confirmed states' participation in APEC along with the Taipei delegation, although Taiwan's international legal sovereignty has not necessarily improved accordingly. Second, APEC membership has enabled Taipei to engage in international cooperation with member economies on a wide range of issues, including narrowing the digital divide among members, anti-terrorism, and capacity building for SMEs. 
